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Abstract
This paper provides a comparative perspective on judicial review in Indonesia 
after the establishment of the Constitutional Court in 2003. It starts by retelling 
the well-known story of the “transformation of American law” over the first 
half of the last century. As narrated by Morton Horwitz, that story is about 
how nineteenth-century industrialisation processes destabilised the premises 
of “Classical Legal Thought”, and then about how the legal realist movement 
exploited the ensuing crisis to transform the way Americans think about law 
and its relationship to other social systems. Mining this story for generalisable 
concepts, the paper argues that the establishment of strong-form judicial 
review necessarily draws on and, in turn, influences prevailing conceptions of 
legal and political authority. These conceptions vary along a continuum, in the 
first case, from public confidence in law’s autonomy to a conception of law 
as deeply immersed in politics, and, in the second case, from a conception of 
legitimate political authority as contingent on a fairly won democratic mandate 
to a conception of political authority as residing in the power holder’s capacity 
to promote important social goals, such as national security or economic 
prosperity. Each of these variables may change independently of the other. In 
certain situations, however, they may also combine to form a relatively stable 
judicial review regime – a hegemonic legitimating ideology in which conceptions 
of legal and political authority lock into and mutually support each other. 
The fourth section uses this conceptual framework to assess the Indonesian 
Constitutional Court’s approach to its mandate after 2003. Under its first two 
chief justices, the paper notes, the Court engaged in a concerted effort to build 
public understanding of its legitimate role in national politics. The Court’s abrupt 
switch between its first Chief Justice, Jimly Asshiddiqie’s legalist conception of 
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law’s authority and his successor, Mohammad Mahfud’s more instrumentalist 
conception, however, has impeded the consolidation of a determinate judicial 
review regime. Given the considerable threats still confronting Indonesia’s 
democracy, this situation is worrisome. The Court urgently needs to present a 
coherent account of its legitimate claim to authority if it is to continue playing 
an effective role.
Keywords: Constitutional Court, Indonesia , Judicial Review, Legal and Political 
Authority
I. INTRODUCTION
Constitutions are seldom written on blank slates. In most cases, they draw 
on contested societal understandings of a range of issues: the social, political 
and economic history of the country concerned; the role that past constitutions 
have played in the regulation of political conflict; the challenges facing the 
country; the potential role of the constitution in addressing these challenges; 
and the relevance of foreign constitutional models and experiences. Unless 
the constitution is imposed from the outside or by authoritarian fiat, these 
contested understandings will shape the constitutional drafting process. On its 
enactment, the constitution will come to embody – in general and sometimes 
ambivalent language – a purportedly shared conception of the legitimate basis 
for the exercise of political power and the role of the judiciary and other state 
institutions in controlling the abuse of such power. 
To the extent that it validates some ways of thinking about these issues 
rather than others, a constitution represents a victory of sorts for the ideas it 
embodies. But such victories are inevitably temporary. As soon as it begins to 
function, a constitution reinvigorates public discussion of the range of issues just 
listed, only this time with the text of the constitution as the central reference 
point. Sometimes, ongoing public discussion may lead to the amendment of the 
constitutional text to better reflect a new societal understanding of a particular 
issue or an understanding that an identifiable sub-group has been able to enforce. 
Even when the constitution is not amended, however, societal understandings 
of the purposes and value of constitutional government continue to evolve. 
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For this reason, it is always advisable to distinguish a society’s constitutional 
tradition from its constitution in the narrower sense of a body of authoritative 
legal norms governing the allocation of state power. Constitutional traditions 
underpin and interact with constitutions in this narrower sense, but they are 
not identical to them. In many societies, the constitutional tradition long 
predates the current written constitution. While the drafters of the written 
constitution may have tried to embody that tradition, such attempts rarely 
succeed completely. In the absence of societal consensus, the constitutional text 
may fudge some questions to give all the competing elements of a tradition 
a semblance of victory. Or certain aspects of the tradition may be just too 
complex to embody perfectly. There will thus always be some tension between 
the written constitution as adopted and the constitutional tradition it seeks to 
reflect.
In other cases, the written constitution may have been adopted precisely to 
transform the country’s constitutional tradition, which may be problematic for 
various reasons. In such cases, an even sharper contrast may develop between 
the society’s constitutional tradition and the text of the written constitution. 
In some cases, there may be a lag-effect as the new written constitution takes 
some time to influence the tradition it is trying to transform. In other cases, the 
written constitution may wholly fail to transform the existing tradition, either 
because actors slip back into familiar thought-ways and patterns of behaving, 
or because there was never really any political will to change.  
The purpose of this paper is to consider one dimension of this dynamic 
process and then to apply a general understanding of it to the Indonesian 
case. Of all the factors making up constitutional traditions, this paper argues, 
two are particularly important to the comparative study of constitutionalism 
and judicial review. These are societal understandings, on the one hand, of 
law’s legitimate claim to authority and, on the other, of political authority. 
What makes those two variables so important is that they are integral to the 
evolution of constitutional traditions in societies that have adopted so-called 
Indonesia’s Judicial Review Regime in Comparative Perspective
Constitutional Review, December 2018, Volume 4, Number 2 191
“strong-form” judicial review1 – the most common form of written constitution 
in the world today.2
In giving courts the power to strike down legislative or executive action 
for non-conformance with their prescriptions, constitutions that provide for 
strong-form judicial review in theory elevate law to a position of social-systemic 
equivalence to politics.3 They in effect say that law is a social system with its 
own claim to authority that may in certain cases trump the rival authority claim 
of politics. The adoption of this form of constitution thus necessarily implicates 
the society’s tradition of thinking about the law/politics relationship in the 
ongoing process of constitutional development. Of all the different aspects 
of its constitutional tradition, the one that takes centre stage is the nature of 
law’s claim to authority and its relationship to political authority. If we want to 
study constitutional development in such a society, therefore, we need to study 
the way in which societal conceptions of the law/politics relationship shape 
and are in turn shaped by the institution of judicial review. That aspect of the 
phenomenon, as partial as it may seem, will be a central part of the drama.
The next section grounds the discussion in a real-world example: the 
transformation of societal understandings of the law/politics relationship that 
occurred in the United States over the first half of the last century. This period 
in American constitutional development is the most widely known instance of 
this phenomenon while at the same time richly illustrative of its dynamics. 
The third section extracts the key elements from the American experience 
that might help to build a comparative framework. The generalisable part 
of the American experience, this section argues, is the causal significance of 
1 The term “strong-form judicial review” was coined in Mark Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review 
and Social Welfare Rights in Comparative Constitutional Law (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008). 
It refers to situations in which the judiciary has been given the power to review statutes for conformance with 
the constitution, and to strike down offending parts of a statute. The term “judicial review” will be used in this 
paper to refer to this specific power. In relation to Indonesia, this means the Constitutional Court’s power in 
Article 24C(1) of the amended 1945 Constitution to review statutes for conformance with the Constitution rather 
than the Supreme Court’s power in Article 24A(1) to review ordinances and regulations. 
2 By 2006, 87% of world constitutions provided either explicitly or in practice for strong-form judicial review. See 
David S. Law and Mila Versteeg, “The Evolution and of Global Constitutionalism,” California Law Review 99, no. 
5 (2011): 1163, 1199.
3 For a longer version of the argument, see Theunis Roux, The Politico-Legal Dynamics of Judicial Review: A 
Comparative Analysis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018).
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two factors: (1) the destabilisation of the ideology of so-called “Classical Legal 
Thought” by the changes to the American economy that occurred in the late 
nineteenth century; and (2) the opportunistic internal challenge to this ideology 
mounted by the legal realist movement in the 1920s. Those two factors suggest 
that settled understandings of the law/politics relationship change when there is 
some exogenous shock to prevailing conceptions of law’s authority and a group 
of committed legal-cultural actors willing and able to exploit the shock to drive 
the relevant change. If that is correct, the key to developing a comparative 
understanding of this phenomenon is to construct a typology of possible stable 
combinations of legal and political authority and then to use that typology 
as a heuristic to examine the dynamics of constitutional-cultural change in 
various settings. The rest of the third section proceeds to classify constitutional 
traditions into four ideal types according to their distinctive combinations of 
legal and political authority. The fourth section then uses the conceptual logic 
underlying these ideal types to reinterpret recent developments in Indonesian 
constitutional politics. The fifth section concludes. 
II. DISCUSSION
2.1. The American Experience 
The discussion has been very abstract so far, so let us ground it in a 
well-known example of the sort of process this paper seeks to explain: the 
transformation of societal understandings of the law/politics relationship that 
occurred in the United States during the first half of the last century. As 
the story of that period in America’s constitutional development is usually 
told, law’s legitimate claim to authority at the beginning of the twentieth 
century was bound up with the ideology of “Classic Legal Thought”.4 Law 
according to that ideology was identified with judge-made common law 
4  See Duncan Kennedy, “Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal 
Thought in America, 1850-1940,” Research in Law and Sociology 3 (1980): 3; Robert W. Gordon, “Legal Thought 
and Legal Practice in the Age of American Enterprise, 1870-1920,” in Professions and Professional Ideologies in 
America, ed. Gerald L Geison (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983), 70; Morton J. Horwitz, The 
Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960: The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
Indonesia’s Judicial Review Regime in Comparative Perspective
Constitutional Review, December 2018, Volume 4, Number 2 193
and was thought to consist of a coherent body of norms that was relatively 
autonomous from politics. The role of legal academics, as famously explained 
by Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell at Harvard University,5 was to 
rationalise this body of norms so that every case decided by a court could 
be assessed according to its conformance to applicable legal principles. 
Judges in turn were legal technicians, and their claim to authority lay in 
their perceived professionalism and detachment from politics.
This understanding of law’s claim to authority steadily changed from 
1900, both in response to external forces and in response to endogenous 
challenges.6 Externally, the American economy had been developing over 
the second half of the nineteenth century from a mainly agricultural 
economy into an industrialized one.7 Accompanying this change, there had 
been a massive population influx to new urban centres like New York and 
Chicago. The conditions of employment in these new centres were harsh 
and living arrangements unhealthy.8 In response, state legislatures began 
to enact minimum wage laws and other social welfare legislation.9 The new 
laws constituted an attempt to expand the scope of the state legislatures’ 
authority. Before 1900, the ideology of laissez-faire, the economic counterpart 
to Classical Legal Thought, had held that private economic relations were 
strictly off-limits to state legislatures – an aspect of social life governed 
by the politically autonomous common law of contract. As a matter of 
constitutional law, this understanding of the law/politics relationship had 
been concretised in the so-called “police power” doctrine, which held that 
state legislatures could intrude into the market only to protect public 
health, safety and morals.10 Thus, when state legislatures began enacting 
social welfare legislation, they were initially perceived as intruding into 
areas beyond the legitimate scope of their authority.
5 See Thomas C. Grey, “Langdell’s Orthodoxy,” University of Pittsburgh Law Review 45 (1983): 1.
6 In addition to Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, this account draws on Howard Gillman, The Constitution 
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The conflict over state legislatures’ attempt to expand the scope of their 
authority famously came to a head in the case of Lochner v. New York11 
and then continued in a series of cases decided by the US Supreme Court 
between 1905 and 1937.12 In Lochner, the Supreme Court decided that a 
maximum working hours law for bakers was unconstitutional against the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause. The decision was roundly 
criticised by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in dissent and by academic 
commentators as a political decision driven by the justices’ support for 
an outdated laissez-faire ideology that it was in any case not their role to 
enforce from the Bench.13 In substantive content, however, the majority 
decision was a straightforward application of the police power doctrine.14 
To be sure, it was an open legal question whether the maximum working 
hours legislation at issue could be said to have been enacted in pursuit of 
public health, safety or morals (as opposed to the private interests of the 
bakers qua employees), but the Supreme Court’s approach to this question 
followed a line of reasoning that was pretty standard at the time. In that 
sense, it was a legally legitimate decision – well within the scope of the 
Court’s authority as it was then understood. What caused the controversy 
in Lochner was not the fact that the case was obviously wrongly decided, 
but that it came at a time when the abovementioned changes to the 
American economy were beginning to destabilise the premises of Classical 
Legal Thought. What had hitherto been a stable relationship between the 
common law’s claim to authority over the regulation of private economic 
matters and state legislatures’ claim to authority over any social problem 
falling within their democratic mandate, began to collapse. 
At roughly the same time as the Lochner line of cases was playing 
itself out, a group of prominent American legal academics mounted an 
internal challenge to the premises of Classical Legal Thought. Inspired by 
11 Lochner v. New York 198 US 45 (1905).
12 The end of the era is marked by the Court’s decision is West Coast Hotel v. Parrish 300 US 379 (1937) (when 
Justice Roberts famously “switched” his vote to favour the constitutionality of New Deal legislation).
13 See Lochner v. New York (Holmes J dissent).
14 See Gillman, The Constitution Besieged.
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the German Freirechtsschule,15 Roscoe Pound and others began critiquing 
the idea that judges were operators of a technical legal machine.16 On the 
contrary, Pound argued, the law was often indeterminate, and judges were 
then essentially in the position of having to decide between competing 
social interests without any authoritative guidance. To do justice in that 
situation, judges had to resort to social science – to the best knowledge 
available about which of several competing legal rules would best promote 
the public interest.17 In arguing thus, Pound seized on the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Lochner as a classic instance of “mechanical jurisprudence” – an 
implausible attempt to deduce the legal content of freedom of contract from 
the semantic scope of the word “liberty” in the Fourteenth Amendment. 
In fact, as noted, the Supreme Court’s decision in Lochner was based on 
a settled line of precedent.18 It was not particularly formalist in the way 
Pound made it out to be. Nevertheless, Pound was able to capitalise on the 
decision’s unpopularity to use it as ammunition in his attack on Classical 
Legal Thought.
Though he later famously fell out with Karl Llewellyn,19 Pound is today 
regarded as someone whose ideas and thinking paved the way for legal 
realism – the jurisprudential movement that gained a foothold in several 
prominent American law schools in the 1920s and 1930s and forever changed 
the way American lawyers, and the American public more broadly, think 
about law’s claim to authority. The full story of the rise of the legal realist 
movement and its impact on American legal thought is contested and too 
complicated to summarise here.20 At its heart, however, was a critique of 
15 See Albert S. Foulkes, “On the German Free Law School (Freirechtsschule),” Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 
/Archives for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy 55 no. 3 (1969): 367; Kristoffel Grechenig and Martin Gelter, 
“The Transatlantic Divergence in Legal Thought: American Law and Economics vs. German Doctrinalism,” Hastings 
International and Comparative Law Review 31 no. 1 (2008): 295.
16 Roscoe Pound, “Mechanical Jurisprudence,” Columbia Law Review 8 (1908): 605.
17 Ibid.
18 Gillman, The Constitution Besieged.
19 See William Twining, Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement 2ed. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2012).
20 See, for example, Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law; Brian Z. Tamanaha, Beyond the Formalist-
Realist Divide: The Role of Politics in Judging (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010); Frederick Schauer, 
“Foreword,” in William Twining, Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement 2ed. (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2012), ix.
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the determinacy of law and legal reasoning, and a positive programme, 
drawing on Pound’s insights, of fixing that problem by resort to social 
science. The philosophical writings of John Dewey also exerted a strong 
intellectual influence on the movement,21 so that it is has been depicted as 
changing the American view of law to one of “pragmatic instrumentalism”.22 
For purposes of this article, the significant issue is that, in a complex 
interaction between the changes to the American economy just described, 
the controversy over the Lochner line of cases, and the sometimes quite 
opportunistic arguments of legal realism, societal understandings of law’s 
claim to authority in the US progressively changed from 1900 through 1937. 
Whereas law’s claim to authority before the turn of the twentieth century 
had been premised on its assumed autonomy from politics, after 1937 its 
authority was increasingly based on its instrumental value in promoting 
concededly partisan-political visions of the public interest and social welfare. 
The story of the evolution of the American “judicial review regime” 
– the complex of legitimating ideas that make up the hegemonic 
understanding of the law/politics relationship in the US – is still unfolding, 
as most recently illustrated in the ructions over Brett Kavanaugh’s Senate 
confirmation hearing. As it functions today, the regime is one in which the 
US Constitution is seen as standing for two competing, even diametrically 
opposed visions of the just society – one based on conservative and the 
other on liberal values. In addition to the factors already mentioned, this 
has occurred because the outdated text of the US Constitution has proved 
malleable enough to allow generations of conservative and liberal judges 
to plausibly claim that their preferred political ideology corresponds to 
the true American constitutional project.23 While each side of politics thus 
presents its interpretation of the Constitution as a precedent-based legal 
interpretation, the dominant societal understanding is that the Constitution 
21  See Robert S. Summers, “Pragmatic Instrumentalism in Twentieth Century American Legal Thought – A Synthesis 
and Critique of our Dominant General Theory about Law and its Use,” Cornell Law Review 66 (1981): 861; Richard 
A. Posner, “What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?” Southern California Law Review 63 (1990): 1653.
22  Summers, “Pragmatic Instrumentalism”.
23  Duncan Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication (Fin de Siècle) (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997).
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has two equally plausible interpretations, each of which is determinate 
according to its ideological premises.24 The stability of this judicial review 
regime, such as it is, comes from the fact that political power regularly 
rotates through democratic elections, meaning that each side of politics is 
eventually given the opportunity to appoint a sufficient number of Supreme 
Court justices to transform its political ideology into constitutional law.
Now that we have illustrated the abstract idea of the evolution of judicial 
review regimes with a practical example, can we generalise it? Are there 
recurrent patterns in the way societal understandings of the law/politics 
relation change character over time that might help us to reinterpret well-
known constitutional developments in other societies?
2.2. Generalising the American Experience
Consider again what happened in the US during the first half of the 
last century. An external development – the transformation of the American 
economy – forced a change in the scope of the state legislatures’ claim to 
political authority. Whereas before 1900, the scope of that authority had 
not extended to regulating the conditions of employment in the new cities 
and other aspects of social welfare, changing economic conditions prompted 
state electorates to demand action on that front. In enacting the new 
social welfare legislation, state legislatures began intruding into what was 
previously thought to be the exclusive domain of law’s authority – private 
economic relations as governed by the common law of contract.
It is important to be precise at this point. The basic form of the state 
legislatures’ claim to political authority had not changed. As before, their 
authority extended to whatever social issues democratic electorates had 
given them a mandate to regulate. What had changed, was the scope of 
that claim in its extension to social welfare legislation and its consequent 
intrusion into areas previously thought to be reserved to the common law 
24 James L. Gibson and Gregory Caldeira, “Has Legal Realism Damaged the Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court?” 
Law & Society Review 45, no. 1 (2011): 195 (finding, on the basis of extensive social surveys, that the American 
public understands that constitutional adjudication is driven by the justices’ political ideologies but accepting 
nevertheless that they have principled resort to those ideologies when deciding cases).
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of contract. The external development, America’s changing economy, had 
driven a change in the scope of the state legislature’s political authority 
and brought it into conflict with extant understandings of the scope of 
law’s authority. That conflict in turn caused a rupture in the premises of 
Classical Legal Thought that the legal realist movement was able to exploit. 
In sometimes opportunistic ways, legal realists drove a new understanding 
of law’s authority as contingent, not on its autonomy from politics, but on 
law’s usefulness as an instrument for the pursuit of political goals. This 
new understanding progressively locked into extant understandings of 
political authority as deriving from a democratic mandate to form a new 
judicial review regime. The key concepts are thus: societal understandings 
of law’s legitimate claim to authority and its relationship to legitimate 
political authority, the capacity of these two forms of authority mutually 
to support each other in a stable judicial review regime, the possibility of 
an exogenous shock to that regime, and the role of legal-cultural actors in 
driving a transition to a new regime. These are the elements of the American 
experience that provide the building blocks for a comparative framework.
In constructing such a framework, the obvious place to start is with the 
idea of claims to legal and political authority. Neither law nor politics makes 
claims, of course; both are just abstract concepts whereas constitutional 
politics is about real people with real interests. Nevertheless, we can use 
the idea of legal and political authority claims as a kind of shorthand for 
what happens when social actors make claims to authority in the name of 
law or politics. A judge handing down a decision thus claims the authority 
to do that as a duly mandated interpreter of the constitution, say, while 
parliamentarians enacting legislation rely on the authority of their democratic 
mandate, and so on.
In each case, the claim needs to be legitimated. Until that happens, 
a claim is just a claim: it is in competition with other claims to authority 
to regulate the same conduct or distribute the same material resources. 
What then legitimates claims to legal or political authority? One answer is 
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to see such claims as being legitimated by their conformance to dominant 
societal understandings of the appropriate relationship between law and 
politics. These understandings, as we have seen, are an aspect of a society’s 
constitutional tradition. In countries that have adopted a system of supreme-
law judicial review, legal and political actors draw on them when they 
engage in constitutional politics. Even before this, constitutional drafters 
are influenced by societal understandings of the law/politics relationship 
when deciding the nature and scope of authority to be conferred on various 
institutions.
As an aspect of its constitutional tradition, societal understandings of 
the law/politics relationship are specific to each country. Constitutional 
traditions are autochthonous and expressive – deeply revealing of the 
unique political history of the country with which they are associated. Once 
consolidated, each country will have its own ever-evolving judicial review 
regime in that sense – a hegemonic societal understanding of the law/politics 
relationship like the one that prevailed in the US before 1900. Nevertheless, 
for comparative purposes, it is possible to identify a more limited number of 
judicial review regimes using a sociological research strategy made famous 
by Max Weber.25 The strategy proceeds by distinguishing the two main 
ways in which claims to legal and political authority are typically made 
and then by combining those conceptual possibilities into four ideal types.
Drawing again on the American experience, the two main conceptions 
of law’s claim to authority that may be distinguished are legalism and 
instrumentalism. Both these conceptions have deep roots in Anglo-American 
legal theory, but also in other jurisprudential traditions, including the 
German.26 On a legalist conception, law’s authority lies in its autonomy as 
a social system. In practical terms, this is expressed as a dominant legal-
cultural ideology rather than an empirically provable fact. The core tenet 
of legalism is that methods of legal reasoning provide politically impartial 
25  Max Weber, Economy and Society, ed. Günther Roth and Claus Wittich (New York: Bedminister Press, 1968).
26  They roughly correspond, for example, to Weber’s notion of formal and substantive rationality (ibid).
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ways for judges to decide cases. It is not necessary for the maintenance of 
this ideology that these decisions should be seen to be uniquely correct, 
provided that the methods judges use are seen to be capable of excluding 
the influence of political factors, such as the judges’ personal world views 
or their partisan political loyalties. There is a complex interaction between 
the development of these legal reasoning methods and public confidence 
in law’s autonomy,27 but for now we can leave it at that.
Certain countries develop this faith in law’s autonomy only to lose it. 
This is what happened in the US during the Lochner era. As we have seen, 
in a complex interplay between the Supreme Court’s increasingly strained 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the legal realists’ assault 
on the determinacy of law, and the rise of pragmatism as the dominant 
societal philosophy, Americans lost their faith in law’s capacity to exclude 
ideological attitudes from legal reasoning processes. In legal academia, this 
was reflected in a turn to social science. If law itself could not provide 
determinate answers to legal questions from within its own immanent logic, 
then the study of legal doctrine was pointless. Legal academics instead should 
take up social science so that they could provide reliable guidance on law’s 
likely consequences. In legal practice, the loss of faith in law’s autonomy 
was similarly reflected in a shift towards consequentialist reasoning. In a 
dispute over which of two legal rules should apply, the semantic scope of 
the rules and their fit with extant legal principles became less important 
than their provable social consequences.28
This new American way of seeing law’s authority is aptly described 
as instrumentalist: law’s authority derives not from its claimed political 
neutrality but from the desirability of the outcomes it produces. The US 
is not the only country whose judicial review regime has undergone such 
a transformation. A similar process occurred in India after the 1975-1977 
27  See section 4 below.
28  See Patrick S. Atiyah and Robert S. Summers, Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law: A Comparative Study 
of Legal Reasoning, Legal Theory, and Legal Institutions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987).
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Emergency.29 In that country, the Supreme Court’s poor performance 
during the Emergency discredited legalism and paved the way for a new 
understanding of the Indian Constitution as an instrument for uplifting the 
poor and other marginalised groups.30
Instrumentalism also tends to be the dominant conception of law’s 
authority in societies in which law has never established its autonomy from 
politics – where law is seen, and always has been seen, as a mere projection 
of political power. In societies like that, law’s claim to authority is derivative 
in the sense that it is only as strong as the authority claim of the political 
power holder that enlists law in service to its ends. This makes law’s claim to 
authority in such societies seem like law’s claim to authority in democratic 
societies that have lost their faith in law’s autonomy. Instrumentalism in such 
societies, however, is crucially different from instrumentalism in democratic 
societies. In the latter instance, the existence of a functioning democratic 
system means that there are always at least two competing visions of the 
just society that law is enlisted to serve. Political parties’ claim to authority 
is in turn legitimated by the authenticity of their democratic mandates, in 
this way lending democratic legitimacy to law’s claim to authority.
Claims to political authority may likewise be divided into two main 
variants. According to the first, political authority derives from the 
authenticity of a democratic mandate. No political party may wield power 
unless it can point to a democratic mandate received in consequence of a 
free and fair election. In the other main variant, political authority derives 
from some or other societal goal that the political power holder claims to 
be promoting, whether that be inter-ethnic harmony, economic prosperity, 
national security, or the furtherance of anti-colonial revolutionary tradition.31 
In societies where this second view of political authority prevails, democratic 
elections may play some role in legitimating political authority, but in the 
29 See Upendra Baxi, The Indian Supreme Court and Politics (Lucknow: Eastern Book Co, 1980).
30 For a compelling recent account of this process, see Anuj Bhuwania, Courting the People: Public Interest Litigation 
in Post-Emergency India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).
31 Singapore is a good example of this type of society. See Jothie Rajah, Authoritarian Rule of Law: Legislation, 
Discourse and Legitimacy in Singapore (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
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end, when the principle of democracy and the political power holder’s 
interests come into conflict, the power holder’s claim to be promoting some 
superior conception of the national interest trumps the need to respect 
the democratic system – and political opponents’ views and activities are 
suppressed in the name of the political power holder’s pursuit of that 
supposedly more important social goal.
At a conceptual level, therefore, we have two main variants of each 
type of authority claim. Both variants of each type may in theory combine 
with either variant of the other type, meaning that there are four possible 
combinations, as depicted in the following table:
Table 1: Typology of Judicial Review Regimes
Political authority 
based on a mandate 
derived from a fully 
competitive democratic 
system that respects 
liberal political rights
Political authority 
based on asserted need 
to subordinate the 
democratic system to 
some overarching and 
democratically non-
negotiable conception 
of the public interest
Law’s authority based 
on public confidence 
in the autonomy of law 
from politics
Democratic Legalism Authoritarian Legalism
Law’s authority based 
on its perceived 
usefulness as an 
instrument for the 






As noted, the assumption underlying Table 1 is that either variant of 
legal authority may lock into either variant of political authority to produce 
a relatively stable understanding of the appropriate relationship between 
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law and politics. An example of the social process through which this might 
occur is given in the discussion of the Indonesian case in section 4 below. 
For the moment, the discussion turns to the mutual legitimation logic that 
binds each of these regimes together.32
Under the first ideal type, democratic legalism, law’s authority is founded 
on the claimed capacity of legal reasoning methods to exclude the influence 
of judges’ personal political values and partisan political commitments on 
judicial decision-making. This understanding of law’s authority is paired 
with a conception of political authority as stemming from a democratic 
mandate received under conditions of free and fair political competition. 
Once consolidated, the ongoing stability of this type of regime depends 
on the judiciary’s observance of the reasoning methods that have come to 
be associated with the ideal of law’s autonomy from politics. Provided the 
judiciary is seen as staying within these limits, or develops these reasoning 
methods only incrementally, its power of judicial review is respected. More 
than this, judicial review serves an important legitimating function in the 
construction of political authority. Judicial review fulfils this function, first, 
by authenticating electoral mandates as the product of a fair and competitive 
democratic process, and secondly, by legitimating those laws and executive 
acts that are not struck down for lack of conformance to the Constitution.33
Authoritarian legalism, by contrast, describes a situation in which a 
public commitment to the separability of law and politics functions, not 
as the legitimate basis on which law speaks truth to political power, but 
as a pretext for certain areas of social life to be put beyond the reach of 
law.34 In such regimes, judicial review continues to operate, and may in 
32 The following exposition of the four ideal types is reproduced from Roux, The Politico-Legal Dynamics of Judicial 
Review.
33 Cf. David M. Trubek, “Complexity and Contradiction in the Legal Order: Balbus and the Challenge of Critical 
Social Thought about Law,” Law & Society Review 11 (Winter 1977): 529, 540 (the “neutrality and autonomy 
of law forms one basis for the claims of political systems in capitalist societies to legitimate authority” (citing 
Weber, Economy and Society, 941-54)).
34 Cf. Terence C. Halliday and Lucien Karpik, “Political Liberalism in the British Post-Colony: A Theme with Three 
Variations,” in Fates of Political Liberalism in the British Post-Colony: The Politics of the Legal Complex, ed. Terence 
C. Halliday, Lucien Karpik and Malcolm Feeley (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012), 3, 15 (analysing 
the path of “despotic order” in British post-colonial states). 
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fact flourish in certain areas, but is ineffective in the crucial sense that it 
provides few resources for proponents of a more open and competitive 
democratic system to challenge authoritarian power holders. While not 
necessarily dispensing with the holding of elections, power holders’ claim 
to authority in authoritarian legalist regimes rests on some alternative basis, 
such as the preservation of ethnic harmony, the promotion of economic 
prosperity or the provision of security from some or other external threat. 
The stability of this regime comes from the residual legitimating role that 
law continues to play in these circumstances, together with power holders’ 
skill in prosecuting their alternative, less than fully democratic claim to 
authority. 
Authoritarian instrumentalism describes a situation where law operates 
as a mere instrument of authoritarian rule, and where law is thus not 
autonomous from politics in any meaningful sense. Here, stability is a 
function of naked force and non-legal forms of legitimation, with law acting 
as a projection of political power rather than a constraint on it. Law has no 
legitimating role in such regimes. Because there are virtually no significant 
areas of social life over which judges exert independent control, law’s claim 
to being autonomous from politics has no credibility. In such regimes, 
law really does function as a subsystem of politics in the sense that it is a 
fully subordinated system with no autonomous capacity to thwart or even 
significantly regulate the abuse of political power. While judicial review 
formally exists, it functions neither to legitimate nor to check political power. 
Rather, judicial review serves a series of purely instrumental functions, 
such as the extension of central political control over regional areas, the 
provision of information to central power-holders, and the transmission 
and implementation of centralized political commands.35
35 See Tamir Moustafa and Tom Ginsburg “Introduction: The Functions of Courts in Authoritarian Politics,” in Rule by 
Law: The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes, ed. Tom Ginsburg and Tamir Moustafa (New York, Cambridge 
University Press, 2008) 4-11; Martin Shapiro, Courts: A Comparative and Political Analysis (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1986). 
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The final ideal type, democratic instrumentalism, brings us back full 
circle to a relatively stable understanding of the relationship between law and 
politics that arises where political authority is founded on the authenticity 
of a democratic mandate. As with democratic legalism, no political party is 
able to compete for, let alone hold, political power in such a regime without 
expressing its commitment to multiparty democracy, and all major political 
players accept that they must relinquish power if defeated in a democratic 
election. (This does not mean that the democratic system actually is free 
from corruption and the influence of moneyed interests. It simply means 
that all parties are outwardly committed to the principle of free and fair 
elections.) What distinguishes this type of judicial review regime from 
democratic legalism is that law’s authority is premised, not on the strenuous 
denial of the irreducibly political nature of constitutional adjudication, but 
on the frank embrace, or at least grudging acceptance, of this fact. In place 
of the denial of law’s politicality, law’s authority is premised on its claimed 
capacity to promote substantively just outcomes and on decision-makers’ 
candour about the politics of constitutional adjudication, which is dealt 
with by foregrounding rather than suppressing the value-laden choices 
that are being made. 
2.3. Indonesia: In Search of a Determinate Judicial Review Regime 
The four judicial review regimes just presented are conceptual constructs 
– theoretically possible ways in which claims to legal and political authority 
may reinforce each other in a stable legitimating ideology. Actually-existing 
judicial review regimes do not conform exactly to these ideal types. Indeed, 
as soon as one considers real-world examples, it is apparent that in every 
society that has adopted a system of strong-form judicial review there is 
a unique and constantly evolving set of societal understandings of legal 
and political authority. Nevertheless, the idea of judicial review regimes 
may be used to explain periods of relative stability in the evolution of 
these understandings – periods, that is, where claims to legal and political 
authority, even as they conflict in the daily business of constitutional 
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politics, support each other at some deeper level. The conceptual framework 
in section 2.2 may also be used to understand the social process through 
which actually-existing judicial review regimes come to stabilize. The rest 
of this section illustrates these points by using the framework to analyse 
the evolution of conceptions of legal and political authority in Indonesia 
after the establishment of a constitutional court with the power of strong-
form judicial review in 2003.  
The first thing to emphasize is that the decision to provide for strong-
form judicial review in Article 24C(1) of the amended 1945 Constitution 
was not the product of a conscious decision to elevate law to a position 
of co-equal status with politics. As with most real-world constitutional 
reform processes, Indonesia’s path to judicial review was marked by political 
bargaining in circumstances of limited information about how the institutions 
being created would function in practice.36 On one view, the establishment 
of judicial review came about as a side-effect of the pursuit of other political 
goals. The “proximate cause” of the creation of the Constitutional Court, 
on this understanding, was the need for an impartial institution to oversee 
the presidential impeachment process.37 Once the decision to create a Court 
for that reason had been taken, additional responsibilities were conferred 
on it, including the power to review statutes for conformance with the 
Constitution.38 On another view, the establishment of judicial review was 
the fulfilment of a long-standing demand for negara hukum (the rule of law) 
that had been consistently voiced in previous (failed) liberal constitutional 
reform processes.39 Even on this understanding, however, it is fair to say 
that the full implications of giving the Constitutional Court the power of 
36 See Donald L. Horowitz, Constitutional Change and Democracy in Indonesia (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2013); Fritz Edward Siregar, “Indonesian Constitutional Politics: 2003–2013” (Doctoral dissertation., UNSW 
Sydney, 2016), 123; Simon Butt, The Constitutional Court and Democracy in Indonesia (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2015), 
11-13; Stefanus Hendrianto, Law and Politics of Constitutional Courts: Indonesia and the Search for Judicial Heroes 
(London, Routledge, 2018), 41 (describing the establishment of the Court as a “joke that turned serious”).
37 Hendrianto, Law and Politics of Constitutional Courts, 52.
38 Ibid.
39 Butt, The Constitutional Court and Democracy, 19-32; Daniel S. Lev, “Judicial Authority and the Struggle for an 
Indonesian Rechtsstaat,” Law & Society Review 13 no. 1 (Autumn 1978): 37.
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judicial review were not fully appreciated.40 Rather, it was left to the first 
group of judges to spell them out – to translate the Constitution’s promise 
of independent judicial review into a functioning institution.
This somewhat uncertain start, along with other factors,41 has complicated 
the consolidation of a determinate judicial review regime in Indonesia. Had 
there been a clearer understanding of the full implications of the institution 
that was being created, the path to consolidation would undoubtedly have 
been smoother. Making matters worse, the Court’s first two chief justices, 
Jimly Asshiddiqie and Mohammad Mahfud, promoted equally valid, but 
very different, understandings of law’s legitimate claim to authority – the 
first discernibly legalist in flavour and the second more instrumentalist. The 
Court’s alternation between those two understandings has further delayed 
the consolidation of a determinate judicial review regime.
That the 1999-2002 constitutional reform process called for a revised 
conception of the law/politics relationship in Indonesia is beyond dispute. 
The amended 1945 Constitution’s provision for free and fair elections and 
multi-party political competition clearly signalled a fundamental change 
to the nature of political authority. Both President Soekarno’s Guided 
Democracy and the New Order regime of President Soeharto had built 
their claim to legitimacy on a combination of charismatic leadership and 
the asserted need to unify the nation in the turbulent Cold War period.42 
With Soeharto’s departure in 1998, the constitutional reform process 
marked a decisive shift towards an understanding of legitimate political 
authority as contingent on a democratic mandate. Although still under 
periodic threat from authoritarian elements,43 Indonesia has maintained a 
steady commitment to that understanding ever since.44 At the same time, 
40 Hendrianto, Law and Politics of Constitutional Courts, 77.
41 These other factors, to list them in one place, include the damage done to law’s authority under previous 
authoritarian administrations, and particularly that of President Soeharto; Indonesia’s civil-law tradition, which 
supports a judicial reasoning style that is arguably not conducive to the sort of role the Constitutional Court 
has been asked to play; and the various corruption scandals that have afflicted the Court over the years.
42 Butt, The Constitutional Court and Democracy, 21-24; Hendrianto, Law and Politics of Constitutional Courts, 43.
43 See Marcus Mietzner, “How Jokowi Won and Democracy Survived,” Journal of Democracy 25, no. 4 (2014): 111.
44 https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2017/indonesia.
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there have been sustained attempts to rebuild the independence of the 
judiciary.45 Law now plays a crucial role in holding political office bearers 
to account, and the courts and other institutions are extensively involved in 
monitoring the fairness of the electoral process.46 It is thus beyond dispute 
that Indonesia has decisively broken with past authoritarian understandings 
of the law/politics relationship. What is less clear, however, is what kind 
of judicial review regime Indonesia is moving towards.
This kind of uncertainty is not unusual, it should immediately be said, 
for a country in Indonesia’s situation. Comparative experience shows that, 
in the wake of profound constitutional changes of the kind that Indonesia 
has undergone, a new hegemonic conception of the appropriate relationship 
between law and politics may take some time to stabilize.47 In Hungary, 
for example, the amendments to its 1989 Constitution have failed to drive 
the anticipated transition to democratic legalism, despite the best efforts 
of an initially powerful Constitutional Court.48 As things stand, Hungary 
is slipping back into a type of authoritarian legalism based on its pre-
Communist, ethno-nationalist tradition.49 In Zimbabwe, too, neither its 
1979 nor its 2013 Constitution has been able to break the stranglehold of 
its historically dominant authoritarian-legalist regime.50   
In Indonesia’s case, the task of articulating the amended 1945 
Constitution’s conception of the law/politics relationship initially fell to 
the first Bench of the Constitutional Court, and particularly to its first 
Chief Justice, Jimly Asshiddiqie. Asshiddiqie, everyone agrees,51 was acutely 
aware of the enormity of the responsibility that had been thrust upon him. 
45 See Butt, The Constitutional Court and Democracy, 20-21. The story of President Soeharto’s assault on the Supreme 
Court is told in Sebastiaan Pompe, The Indonesian Supreme Court: A Study of Institutional Collapse (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications, 2005).
46 Butt, The Constitutional Court and Democracy, 147-290.
47 See Roux, The Politico-Legal Dynamics of Judicial Review, 269-280. 
48 The Hungarian Constitutional Court under its first President, László Sólyom.
49 Miklós Bánkuti, Gábor Halmai and Kim Lane Scheppele, “Hungary’s Illiberal Turn: Disabling the Constitution,” 
Journal of Democracy 23, no. 3 (2012): 138.
50 See Roux, The Politico-Legal Dynamics of Judicial Review, 193-241.
51 Hendrianto, Law and Politics of Constitutional Courts; Butt, The Constitutional Court and Democracy; Siregar, 
Indonesian Constitutional Politics.
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Appreciating that the Constitution’s promise that law would enjoy a status 
co-equal with politics could not simply be taken for granted, he insisted 
that the Constitutional Court should be accommodated in a fashion worthy 
of the role it had been asked to perform.52 The Court’s imposing Graeco-
Roman building, with its nine pillars and central location in Jakarta, has 
done much to ensure that its decisions are taken seriously.53 In addition to 
this, the Court under Asshiddiqie’s chief justiceship worked hard to develop 
consistent standards, both for the holding of judicial conferences and for 
what was expected of judges when writing their opinions.54 The Court also 
took proactive steps to explain its institutional role to the Indonesian public.55
Judging by the nature of these initial steps, it is fair to say that Asshiddiqie 
set about building a legalist understanding of the Court’s authority. One of 
the things Asshiddiqie did, for example, was to establish a new practice of 
reasoned opinion-writing that departed from the declaratory style associated 
with Indonesia’s civil law tradition.56 He also encouraged the writing of 
dissents, thus presenting the decision-making process as one in which judges 
strive to give their own good-faith account of the law.57 At the same time, 
the first Bench’s remedial orders were generally non-intrusive – a species of 
weak-from review.58 By suspending orders for invalidity, using prospective 
overruling, and granting conditionally constitutional orders, the Court under 
Asshiddiqie’s leadership preserved a sense of the political branches’ primary 
responsibility for policy.59 Together with the other steps taken, this went 
some way towards building an understanding of law as an autonomous 
system of logically ordered norms that has the capacity to constrain both 
politically partisan and ideologically motivated judicial decision-making.
52 Hendrianto, Law and Politics of Constitutional Courts, 79.
53 Ibid. (The building was completed in 2007, just one year before Asshiddiqie left office.)
54 Siregar, Indonesian Constitutional Politics, 99-102.
55 Ibid, 115.
56 Siregar, Indonesian Constitutional Politics, 123; Butt, The Constitutional Court and Democracy, 61.
57 Butt, The Constitutional Court and Democracy, 67.
58 Hendrianto, Law and Politics of Constitutional Courts.
59 Ibid, 103-127. The major seeming exception to this cautious approach was the Asshiddiqie Court’s Education 
Budget V decision (Constitutional Court Decision No, 13/PUU-VI/2008) in which the Court ordered compliance 
with the constitutional requirement that 20% of the budget be set aside for education.
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By the time Asshiddiqie came up for re-election as Chief Justice in 2008, 
therefore, he had done much to put Indonesia’s judicial review regime on a 
path to consolidation around a version of democratic legalism. The particular 
version of this regime that the Court was helping to build was one in which 
its claim to authority would have been contingent on its reputation for 
impartial enforcement of the ground rules for sound democratic governance. 
But Asshidiqqie, of course, was not re-elected. For reasons that are hard to 
establish with certainty, he was defeated in an intra-curial vote for the chief 
justiceship by Mahfud, a then newly appointed judge who had promised 
at his nomination hearing to adopt a more deferential approach to the 
implementation of the Court’s mandate.60  
Much has been written about the Court’s change of direction under 
its second chief justice.61 For present purposes, the key point is that 
Mahfud’s accession to the chief justiceship cut across the democratic-legalist 
understanding of the Court’s authority that Asshiddiqie had propounded. 
This was the consequence not so much of a deliberate change in strategy 
as the fact that Mahfud had a very different conception of law’s authority. 
Taking shape during his doctoral research at Gadjah Mada University, Mahfud 
MD’s personal judicial philosophy was influenced by two theorizations of 
law in particular: Nonet and Selznick’s idea of “responsive law” and Satjipto 
Rahardjo’s so-called “progressive legal approach” (hukum progresif).62 
Both these theorizations conceive of law’s authority as residing, not in its 
autonomy from politics, but in its capacity to promote a certain kind of 
politics: participatory, engaged, and social-justice-seeking. 
On his elevation to the Bench, Mahfud began to operationalize this 
conception in the form of a “substantive justice” approach to decision-
60 Although the chief justiceship was decided by internal judicial vote, there were some suggestions of political 
influence. See Theunis Roux and Fritz Siregar, “Trajectories of Curial Power: The Rise, Fall and Partial Rehabilitation 
of the Indonesian Constitutional Court,” Australian Journal of Asian Law 16, no. 2, Article 2 (2016): 1, 10.
61 See Hendrianto, Law and Politics of Constitutional Courts; Butt, The Constitutional Court and Democracy; Siregar, 
Indonesian Constitutional Politics.
62 Phillippe Nonet and Philip Selznick, Toward Responsive Law: Law & Society in Transition (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction Publishers, 2001). See Siregar, Indonesian Constitutional Politics, 115; Hendrianto, Law and Politics 
of Constitutional Courts, 161.
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making.63 Under his chief justiceship, the Court’s opinions became more 
reliant on broad concepts like justice and fairness as opposed to direct 
references to constitutional provisions.64 Ideologically, too, the Mahfud Court 
began to articulate a more explicit pro-poor agenda.65 As Simon Butt puts it, 
the Court under Mahfud became “arguably more concerned with resolving 
immediate political issues and building popularity than with applying or 
creating legal principles that could be readily applied in future cases”.66 Its 
remedial orders at the same time became more intrusive.67 If Asshiddiqie’s 
leadership style had been one of “prudential-minimalism”, Mahfud was a 
chief justice in a more traditionally “heroic” mould.68 In the conceptual 
vocabulary developed here, the Court under Mahfud’s chief justiceship 
began to stake out its claim to authority on noticeably more instrumentalist 
grounds. What mattered was the consequences of the Court’s decisions, 
and whether they were perceived to be just or not. 
As should now be clear, this second way of conceiving of law’s authority 
is perfectly valid in the abstract. Other courts have defended their authority 
in this way and this has proved in certain circumstances to be a basis for 
stable constitutional governance. There is a question in Indonesia’s case, 
however, about whether the timing of the Court’s adoption of such an overtly 
instrumentalist conception of its authority was right – both because this 
conception came as such a sudden corrective on the Asshiddiqie Court’s 
approach and because Indonesia’s constitutional democracy was still in its 
infancy. 
It is interesting in this respect that Mahfud’s views were so strongly 
influenced by Nonet and Selznick’s work. In their book, Toward Responsive 
Law, these authors distinguish three kinds of legal order – repressive, 
autonomous and responsive – and express a normative preference for 
63 See Siregar, Indonesian Constitutional Politics, 115; Butt, The Constitutional Court and Democracy, 80; Hendrianto, 
Law and Politics of Constitutional Courts, 167.
64 Butt, The Constitutional Court and Democracy, 63.
65 Hendrianto, Law and Politics of Constitutional Courts, 163.
66 Butt, The Constitutional Court and Democracy, 64.
67 Ibid, 124.
68 Hendrianto, Law and Politics of Constitutional Courts, 4.
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the latter.69 They are careful to say, however, that there is no necessary 
developmental progression between these modes and that there are 
considerable risks associated with a transition to responsive law.70 In 
particular, because the responsive conception (which is similar to what this 
paper has been calling an instrumentalist conception) is founded on law’s 
openness to political influence, there is a risk that a deliberate attempt to 
drive a transition towards it will politicize the judicial process, making it 
harder for the Court to establish its legitimacy.
Nonet and Selznick’s advice is borne out by comparative experience. 
As we have seen, there are two countries in which a transition to 
democratic instrumentalism has successfully occurred – the US and India. 
In both these cases, however, judicial review was firmly established at 
the time the transition took place. Each country had also enjoyed a long 
tradition of judicial independence. In the US, the transition to democratic 
instrumentalism came on the back of profound economic changes and the 
sustained ideational work done by the legal realist movement. In India, 
the transition was aided by the damage done to legalism by the Court’s 
performance during the 1975-77 Emergency and the charismatic leadership 
provided by the post-Emergency justices, Bhagwati and Krishna Iyer JJ. 
Another crucial factor in India’s case was that these two justices had the 
backing of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, whose pro-poor political program 
they were in effect implementing.71 In both the US and India, therefore, the 
risks that Nonet and Selznick talked about were reduced.  
The situation was quite different in Indonesia. As noted, Mahfud had 
been appointed on the back of a promise to adopt a more deferential 
approach. He consequently lacked the political support that Bhagwati and 
Krishna Iyer JJ had enjoyed when implementing their pro-poor vision of 
the Indian Supreme Court’s role. Without that kind of political support, 
69 Nonet and Selznick, Toward Responsive Law.
70 Ibid.
71 Granville Austin, Working a Democratic Constitution: A History of the Indian Experience (New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), 485-97.
Indonesia’s Judicial Review Regime in Comparative Perspective
Constitutional Review, December 2018, Volume 4, Number 2 213
there was a risk that Mahfud’s well-intentioned efforts to turn the Court 
into a forum for promoting substantive justice would be misconstrued as 
the pursuit of a purely private agenda. 
In South Africa, when the American Critical Legal Studies scholar, 
Karl Klare, recommended that the Constitutional Court should adopt 
a more openly politicized understanding of its mandate, the Court was 
appropriately circumspect.72 While it did adopt Klare’s reading of the 1996 
South African Constitution as embodying a commitment to “transformative 
constitutionalism”, it supported that reading in traditionally legalist fashion 
with references to the constitutional text. In this way, the Court was able 
to present its decisions as conforming to orthodox understandings of law’s 
authority even as those decisions intruded ever further into the democratic 
process.73 The German Constitutional Court adopted a similarly legalist 
approach to its understanding of its mandate.74
These processes are complex, and the lines of causation are far from 
clear. But the Mahfud Court’s move to a more politicized conception of 
law, coupled with the greater intrusiveness of its remedial orders when 
compared to the Asshiddiqie Court, certainly did not help to fortify the 
Court’s position. By abruptly changing the basis for the Court’s claim to 
authority, Mahfud’s substantive justice approach arguably exposed it to 
charges of judicial overreach. In 2011,75 and again in 2013,76 the Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR) amended the Court’s governing statute in an 
attempt to return it to its original “negative legislator” mandate.77 
Over and above their immediate policy rationales, the 2011 and 2013 
amendments should be understood as an attempt to redraw the boundary 
72 Theunis Roux, “Transformative Constitutionalism and the Best Interpretation of the South African Constitution: 
A Distinction without a Difference?” Stellenbosch Law Review 20, no. 2 (2009): 258.
73 Theunis Roux, “The South African Constitutional Court’s Democratic Rights Jurisprudence: A Response to Samuel 
Issacharoff,” Constitutional Court Review 5 (2014): 33.
74 Michaela Hailbronner, Traditions and Transformations: The Rise of German Constitutionalism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015).
75 Law 8 of 2011. 
76 In presidential emergency interim order (PERPU) 1 of 2013 confirmed by Law 4 of 2014.
77 See Simon Butt and Tim Lindsey, The Constitution of Indonesia: A Contextual Analysis (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2012), 144-146.
Indonesia’s Judicial Review Regime in Comparative Perspective
Constitutional Review, December 2018, Volume 4, Number 2214
between law and politics. As the President and the DPR saw things, the 
Court had expanded the scope of its authority beyond what had originally 
been intended. There was no question of judicial review regime change – of 
anyone seeking a return to authoritarian legalism. Rather, what was being 
attempted was the contraction of the scope of law’s authority along the 
lines of what occurred in the US in 1937 when the Supreme Court, under 
the threat of Roosevelt’s court-packing plan, relinquished authority over 
economic legislation.78 
Understood in these terms, the 2011 and 2013 amendments constituted an 
important opportunity for the Constitutional Court to try to build a shared 
understanding of its legitimate role in national politics. This opportunity, 
however, was not taken up. Instead, the Court struck down many of the 2011 
amendments,79 depicting the legislation as an attack on its independence. 
Given that the amendments were in part driven by legitimate concerns 
about the personal integrity of some of the justices,80 this stance appears 
somewhat dogmatic. From a comparative perspective, at least, the Court’s 
strong defence of its independence was arguably not appropriate to a situation 
where (a) there were genuine reasons for the political branches to introduce 
more effective judicial accountability measures; (b) Indonesia’s democracy, 
though still under threat from authoritarian elements, was improving and 
capable of legitimately expressing the people’s desire for such measures.81
Something similar happened in 2013, when there was even more reason, 
given the Akil Mochtar corruption scandal,82 for the Court to try to find an 
accommodation with the political branches. While the Court’s striking down 
78 Robert G., McCloskey, The American Supreme Court 4th ed revised by Sanford Levinson (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2005), 101.
79 Constitutional Court Decision 48/PUU-IX/2011 and Constitutional Court Decision 49/PUU-IX/2011.
80 Stefanus Hendrianto, “The Indonesian Constitutional Court at a Tipping Point,” International Journal of Consti-
tutional Law Blog, October 3, 2013, http://www.iconnectblog.com/2013/10/the-indonesian-constitutional-court-
at-a=tipping-point. 
81 See Owen M. Fiss, “The Right Degree of Independence,” in Transition to Democracy in Latin America: The Role of 
the Judiciary, ed. Irwin P. Stotzky (Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1992) 55; Stephen Holmes, “Judicial Independence 
as Ambiguous Reality and Insidious Illusion,” in From Liberal Values to Democratic Transition: Essays in Honour of 
János Kis, ed. Ronald Dworkin (Budapest, Central European University Press, 2004), 3, 9. 
82 See Hendrianto, Law and Politics of Constitutional Courts, 196-98.
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of the 2013 amendments again appeared forceful, it was the wrong kind 
of forcefulness. A Court’s legitimate claim to authority in a constitutional 
democracy, on either a legalist or an instrumentalist conception, comes not 
from dogmatic defence of its prerogatives, but from its ability to present 
a defensible account of its role in national politics. It is not clear how the 
Court’s decisions on the 2011 or 2013 amendments did that.
While the Court has recovered from the immediate damage done to 
its public support by the Mochtar scandal,83 its rather crude defence of 
its independence in 2011 and 2013 raises questions about the future of 
Indonesian constitutionalism. To be sure, the Court is still playing an 
important role in safeguarding democracy – demonstrated, for example, by 
its decisions on the losing candidate, Prabowo Subianto’s challenge to the 
2014 presidential election outcome84 and the so-called “MD3 law”,85 which 
threatened rights to freedom of speech and association. But the Court has 
on two other occasions avoided taking decisions on democracy-threatening 
measures. In the first of these, the Court suspended its order of invalidity 
on the constitutionality of staggered legislative and presidential elections 
until after the 2014 elections.86 In the second, it first rejected a challenge 
to a 20% presidential election threshold requirement,87 and then delayed 
deciding a renewed challenge until after the 2019 elections.88 These decisions 
suggest that the Court is less certain than it used to be about its ability 
to survive a direct confrontation with the political branches. Part of the 
reason for this, this article has argued, is its equivocation between a legalist 
and instrumentalist conception of its authority. Until the Court settles 
83 Bjoern Dressel and Tomoo Inoue, “Megapolitical Cases before the Constitutional Court of Indonesia since 2004: 
An Empirical Exploration” (unpublished paper presented at the 2nd Indonesian Constitutional Court International 
Symposium on the “Constitutional Court and Constitutionalism in Political Dynamics,” Yogyakarta, 1-3 October 2018).
84 Constitutional Court Decision 1/PHPU.Pres-XII/2014
85 Constitutional Court Decision 16/PUU-XVI/2018.
86 Constitutional Court Decision 14/PUU-XI/2013.
87 Constitutional Court Decision 53/PUU-XV/2017.
88 Abdurrachman Satrio, “Constitutional Retrogression in Indonesia under President Joko Widodo’s Government: 
What Can the Constitutional Court Do?” (unpublished paper presented at the 2nd Indonesian Constitutional Court 
International Symposium on the “Constitutional Court and Constitutionalism in Political Dynamics,” Yogyakarta, 
1-3 October 2018).
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on one or the other of these conceptions (preferably the former, given 
the problems with instrumentalism in the transitional context), it cannot 
hope to build a defensible public understanding of its legitimate role in 
national politics. Instead, its public support will continue to fluctuate with 
changing public perceptions of the personal moral integrity of the justices 
and the competence and reliability of other institutions. Whether this will 
be enough is questionable given the profound challenges facing Indonesia’s 
democracy.89 In the circumstances, the Court would do well to re-dedicate 
itself to the work that Chief Justice Asshiddiqie began. That means paying 
attention to the technical quality of its decisions, presenting an account of 
its authority as stemming from the impartiality of its reasoning processes 
rather than from the justices’ personal conceptions of social justice, and 
engaging in continued efforts to educate the public about the nature of its 
role in Indonesia’s democracy.
III. CONCLUSION
This paper presented a comparative framework for understanding the 
evolution of judicial review regimes and then applied that framework to examine 
the development of Indonesia’s judicial review regime after 2002. It started 
by relating the well-known story of the transformation of American law that 
occurred over the first half of the last century. As told by Morton Horwitz and 
others, that story is about how the premises of Classical Legal Thought were 
destabilised by the changes to the American economy that occurred in the 
second half of the nineteenth century, and about how the legal realist movement 
exploited the ensuing crisis to transform the dominant American conception 
of the law/politics relationship. Mining that well-known story for generalizable 
concepts, the paper posited that the two main variables driving constitutional 
development in systems of strong-form judicial review are societal conceptions 
of law’s claim to authority, on the one hand, and societal conceptions of political 
89 See Marcus Mietzner, “Fighting Illiberalism with Illiberalism: Islamist Populism and Democratic Deconsolidation 
in Indonesia,” Pacific Affairs 91, no. 2 (2018): 261; Edward Aspinall, “Twenty Years of Indonesian Democracy: How 
Many More?” http://www.newmandala.org/20-years-reformasi/.
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authority, on the other. Each of those variables, the paper argued, is liable to 
change independently of the other. Under certain conditions, however, they may 
also lock into each other to form a relatively stable judicial review regime. The 
paper then set out four ideal-typical such regimes defined by their distinctive 
combinations of legal and political authority. The fourth section applied this 
framework to Indonesia, arguing that the Constitutional Court’s equivocation 
between a legalist and instrumentalist conception of its claim to authority 
has delayed the consolidation of a determinate judicial review regime. The 
stabilisation of such a regime, the paper concluded, is vitally necessary if the 
Court is to continue to play an effective role in supporting Indonesia’s democracy.
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